Arab Humanitarian Workers and their Reception of Chinese Aid
I first heard about Chinese humanitarian aid in a graduate class on Chinese international development theory: not once during several years of working in the development sector in Jordan with humanitarian organizations had I encountered any mention of China’s contributions to war and refugee relief.
Arriving in China with the aspiration of understanding a continent-sized country changed that lack of awareness. As I began academic life in China – with an interest in the intersections of development and humanitarian work – I found that Chinese aid was of growing importance in some Arab countries.
The AidData lab at William & Mary's Global Research Institute estimates that total Chinese aid (both development and humanitarian) to the Middle East was $64.5 billion between 2001 and 2021 (AidData, 2024). The volume of Chinese aid typically ranges from $0.5 million to under $15 million USD annually per partner country.
Various articles and reports highlight where this aid has gone. They include China's contributions to building refugee-hosting and sanitation facilities (UNHCR, 2018), supporting COVID-19 mitigation efforts in most Arab States (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2021), and providing natural disaster relief.
Examples of previous donations include $1 million to support UNICEF's efforts with school-aged Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Xinhua, 2018) and a total of $2 million from China in 2018 and 2019 to UNHCR in Iraq (UNHCR, 2019), which also reported significant contributions from private donors in mainland China and Hong Kong (UNHCR, 2022). Additionally, $4 million was dedicated to earthquake relief efforts in Syria (CIDCA, 2023).
These amounts are considered relatively small from a global perspective. Despite being the world’s second-largest economy, China is not among the top 20 humanitarian donors for any Middle Eastern country, including Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq, despite its vocal advocacy at UN platforms for ceasefire, peacebuilding, and post-war rehabilitation (Financial Tracking Service 2024, Chinese Permanent Mission to Geneva 2023).
In the ongoing conflict in Gaza, China is coordinating with neighboring Egypt to deliver humanitarian aid and necessities (The State Council, 2024). China extended $2 million in emergency assistance to the Palestinian National Authority and United Nations agencies working in Gaza, and sent material donations valued at $2.1 million to Gaza via Egypt, with more promised (He, 2024). In May 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $69 million in humanitarian aid to Gaza and $3 million to UNRWA (Reuters, 2024).
Most of this support is routed through United Nations agencies such as UNRWA, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, or directly to local governments. Unlike aid from the European Union, China does not issue public calls for applications or grants to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Community Based Organisations (CBOs) that operate abroad.
Characteristics of Chinese Aid
China says it offers high-quality aid, attempting to differentiate itself from Western donors by emphasizing partnership, sustainability, and non-interference. My research on this aid revealed four key characteristics:
● Aid from China comes from a developing economy with its own challenges. Priorities in China include addressing food security, employment, and social mobility for its own large population. It is not widely known that the majority of China’s land cannot be cultivated, which means that the country with the largest population in the world faces serious challenges to feed its citizens (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024).
● Chinese humanitarian aid is generally not easy to trace. Language, structural differences in donations, and varying approaches to aid create barriers to understanding project timelines, sequences, frequency, and follow-up.
● Chinese aid is increasingly institutionalized. The China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was established in 2018, evolving from a department in the Ministry of Commerce to a dedicated institution (The Australian National University, 2020).
● Chinese aid typically comes in small amounts, ranging from 0.5-10 million USD, with larger allocations reserved for crises such as famine and natural disasters, the latter being one of its strengths.
What do Arab Humanitarian Practitioners Think?
With growing pessimism about the effectiveness and intentions of international aid – especially with Gaza under attack and the lack of coverage of Sudan's famine and ongoing war – can China step in where Western donors are falling short? My research attempted to examine these questions, with a particular focus on what those who work in the humanitarian sector in the region think about Chinese assistance.
In conducting this research, I interviewed 90 humanitarian practitioners in Iraq and Palestine, reaching them with an invitation-only survey, followed by a series of interviews to further contextualize the findings. Many wrote back from displacement settings, or places of (relative) safety but growing uncertainty and angst. These engagements showed that:
● Public awareness of Chinese humanitarian aid, as per the practitioners, is significantly low in Iraq and Palestine among the general public, and many believe there is inadequate media coverage in both contexts.
“With 10 years' experience with INGOs in Iraq, I have never worked with a Chinese NGO or a Chinese funder”, a practitioner commented. “No one in Iraq knows them”, a second one asserted. This sentiment was a common pattern. “Maybe due to competition between US and China’s interests”, one reasoned.
● Humanitarian workers in Iraq view Chinese aid skeptically or negatively, while those in Palestine have more favorable opinions.
“Every donor has their own agenda representing their country’s interests. China is an ally to the Palestinian people, and their agenda would most likely be advantageous to Palestine.” Another contributor added, "Actually, I don’t have a lot of opportunities to get involved with humanitarian aid from China, but from my long-time experience in this field, we are very open to working with people and projects from China in the humanitarian sector. Some projects have some hidden purposes on a political level and aim to find channels to promote their agenda.”
● Despite mixed views, there is a strong willingness in both regions to receive Chinese aid, with most practitioners saying they do not believe Chinese aid has hidden purposes.
Chinese humanitarian aid was also viewed through a decolonial lens: “I do not see that China’s humanitarian aid agenda is similar to the agenda of the colonial Western countries. I see that China’s agenda is a development agenda.” a practitioner from Palestine said.
● Opinions are divided on whether Chinese aid creates dependency, with it being mostly associated with partnership, sustainability, and respect for local cultures.
“My personal opinion is that there is no hidden agenda, however, in this context, there is a wave currently against gender campaigns and Western agenda”; suggesting that it may be challenging for China to initiate programs in these sectors. Otherwise, most interviewees did not see a problem in Chinese funding for civil society objectives.
China’s efforts are complemented by advocacy through the UN Security Council and other international fora. In my full study, I provide insights and figures from conversations with Middle Eastern humanitarian practitioners on Chinese aid, and develop an analysis of Chinese aid development, projects, and underlying interests and perspectives, aiming to understand China as an emerging aid player in the region, and potentially the world.
Diana Ishaqat is a development practitioner and artist from Jordan. She is a Chevening and a Schwarzman Scholar with a Master's in Global Affairs from Tsinghua University. This blog was developed through discussions at the Mapping Connections Institute, held in Beirut between 27th – 30th May 2024 as part of the ‘Inter-Asia Week’ (Inter-Asia Partnership). The views expressed are the personal perspectives of the writer and not attributable to the Mapping Connections partner institutions.