Why Study China and Iraqi Kurdistan?

China is emerging as an important actor in the Middle East. The relationship is becoming more visible through goods, trade, infrastructure, diplomatic summits, and soft power. The literature on China and the Middle East is also expanding rapidly but is primarily focused on state-to-state or state-to-region (Middle East, MENA) relationships. Nevertheless, China’s relationship to the region is not limited to states or regions; in addition to these, China also cultivates and enhances its relationship with non-state actors, political parties, and civil societies.

In this piece, I will argue that in addition to its state-to-state relationship, China's relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan, as a state-non-state actor, is crucial to understanding China’s role in the region and its global expansion. Some context is required before attempting to answer the question of why this is the case. China opened a general consulate in Erbil in 2014, the last of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council to do so. China’s move followed the inclusion of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the Iraqi constitution. Previously, the two sides had little direct contact.

China is now one of the KRG's primary trading partners. The former is broadening its partnership into infrastructure, telecommunications, and education, and other types of soft power. The relationship, however, remains sensitive, complex, and potentially controversial for the future. The following are five major reasons why studying the China-Iraqi Kurdistan relationship is so important.

First: China pursues a limited relationship.

China does not fully recognize the KRG. While China has established a general consulate in Erbil, it has so far refused to allow the KRG to establish a representative office in Beijing. A number of issues underpin this half-recognized relationship, including: (a) China's relationship with minority groups, which reflects the complexities of domestic Chinese politics and one China policy; (b) China's sensitivity to any form of decentralization; (c) China's advocacy of an absolute Westphalian approach to IR and reluctance to follow the R2P doctrine; and (d) China does not consider any political issue elsewhere and its approach remains seeking its interests despite the circumstances.

In an interview, Kawa Mahmud, the leader of the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party, recalled a poignant experience in this regard. The CCP displayed the flag and a landmark picture of each country's delegates during a meeting with a delegation of Arab left-wing parties. One of the invited parties was the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party. When it was Kurdistan's turn, the Chinese did not display the Kurdish flag, instead showing a photograph of the Erbil citadel with a Kurdish flag on it.

This attempt to avoid displaying the Kurdistan flag exemplifies China's aversion to any symbol of independence or separation from the center. China not only opposes self-determination, but also remains on the sidelines, as its attitude towards Ethiopia has demonstrated. Studies comparing Africa and the Middle East will help shed more lights on the China-MENA relationship in this regard. As a result, Iraqi Kurdistan represents China's delicate diplomacy in this area as an example of the periphery challenging the center. As the anecdote shows, China tries to accommodate the Kurds while refusing to grant their wishes.

 Second, Kurdistan as a post-unipolar theater 

Iraq and the Iraq War hold a special place in American memory. Iraqi territory was used to demonstrate the United States' hegemonic power. As a result, China's involvement in Iraq may be more vulnerable to US power than in other places. Iraq feeds the Chinese narrative of US strategic failure. When China signed the infrastructure treaty with Iraq, it attempted to frame it within the context of the bomb and build a narrative of dichotomy, i.e., US bombing and China building. As a result, the rise and fall of US unipolarity is directly related to China's presence in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Kurdistan is one of the few places where China and the United States have a strong presence. During the Cold War, superpowers used the region to shape each other's perceptions. "What I want is for the Politburo in Moscow to be in a frame of mind not to want to get involved in further adventures in the Middle East," Henry Kissinger said in relation to Kurdistan. It remains to be seen how much of that history haunts the region, making Iraqi Kurdistan a fertile field for research.

Third: Economic versus security dilemma 

There is no alternative to the US security provider for the Kurds. Over the last three decades, the United States has been building a partnership with Iraqi Kurds that includes institution building, unifying and reforming armed groups, and economic support. China is unwilling to replace these, but the KRG cannot avoid Chinese economic interests. The regional elites are wary and hope to keep the relationship out of the spotlight. How is this delicate balance going to be maintained across a broader security sector that includes telecommunications and cyber?

Four: the phenomenon of the Memorandum of Understanding 

The majority of agreements between China, Iraq, and Iraqi Kurdistan are memoranda of understanding rather than treaties. This may be common elsewhere, but it is especially important in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi constitution requires international treaties and agreements to be approved by the Council of Representatives; however, this does not apply to the MoU. 
As a result, the entire deal with China is kept within a small circle of the executive, avoiding any transparency or accountability. Furthermore, in a sociopolitical environment like Iraq, secrecy fosters rumors and conspiracy theories. This could be due to a variety of factors, including the highly centralized nature of the Chinese state, avoiding revelry attentions (US), maintaining a low profile, and avoiding any legal obligations that signing a treaty might entail.

Five: Development and post-democratization 

China would prefer to emphasize its version of development over democracy. The United States' mission to democratize Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan did not result in democratic governance. The Chinese model and narrative of development led by a strong man, is marketed as a viable alternative to the chaos of democracy. As a result, economic achievements such as large-scale poverty reduction, massive infrastructure investment, and other aspects of development are direct results of China's authoritarian government. This narrative and actions have the potential to strengthen anti-democratic and autocratic forces. This has an impact not only on the political system, but also on personal freedoms, security, and governance engineering. When it comes to Chinese soft power in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, it is clear what China both prioritizes and ignores. 

Iraqi Kurdistan has a number of other characteristics in addition to those listed above. The history of Maoism in the region and its impact on local politics is not well known, but it has a direct impact on the current relationship. Kurdish Maoism was not directly affiliated with global Maoism. The Kurdish Maoists had no direct knowledge of how the system worked within the country. It was a phantasm for them, but Maoism, as a "cultural phenomenon," provides a safe haven in which anyone can invest whatever they want. "That is why it manifests itself in such disparate ways from country to country," Christophe Bourseiller explained. In addition, the classic poetry, songs, and folklore of Iraq's Kurds contain an intriguing image of China.

Sardar Aziz. PhD. Researcher, advisor and columnist. Focused on China Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan relationship. Former senior advisor Kurdistan parliament/Iraq. PhD at University College Cork/Ireland.