The China Factor: Hedging, Balancing and Bandwagoning Strategies of the United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in a Changing World Order
Figure 1: “President Xi Jinping Meets With King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 12 Sept. 2022, www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202212/t20221209_10987704.html.
Figure 2: “Xi Jinping Meets With Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi of the United Arab Emirates.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2 May 2022.
China’s growing influence on the world stage is evident in its efforts to cultivate strong partnerships in the Middle East, particularly with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As part of this, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2022 visit to Saudi Arabia underscored China’s desire for a “comprehensive strategic partnership,”[1] envisioning a multipolar world order with a prominent place for the oil-rich Kingdom. Similar sentiments were expressed towards the United Arab Emirates, albeit with a more informal tone. This points towards China’s strategic approach to both countries.
But how do Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates view this partnership? National interests undoubtedly shape their perspectives. This question gains further weight in the context of the US-declared “Great Power” competition with China, since both countries are considered strategically dependent on the United States. While the US views China as a challenger, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, along with many other countries, actively engage with China through BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and other trade agreements.
Furthermore, since 2011, a growing divergence between the security concerns of Saudi Arabia and the UAE and those of the United States has pushed the two Gulf states to diversify their partnerships, with China emerging as a crucial new option.
[1] Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with China in 2016. While the United Arab Emirates signed the agreement in 2018.
Beyond Middle Powers Theory
One way of understanding how Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates see their partnership with China is the ‘Middle Powers’ theory – the notion that influential countries with enough power projection can shape regional and global orders. As part of this, ‘great powers’ often seek the support and cooperation of ‘middle powers’ to implement their larger strategies. However, this traditional definition of middle powers is drawn from the Western experience, and might not fully apply to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, some have argued that such countries are better considered ‘awkward powers’, or states with an uncertain or contested global position.
Such definitional debates point to the importance of a flexible approach, incorporating elements of middle power theory and emphasising the strategic behaviour of middle powers in periods of transition. This allows us to examine various strategic behaviours employed by these countries, including balancing against US dominance with China, ‘bandwagoning’ if China becomes the clear leader, ‘buck-passing’ (avoiding choosing sides), or ‘hedging’ (engaging with both powers simultaneously).
China-Gulf Relations Today
Since 2011, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have significantly strengthened their partnerships with China. Energy cooperation remains the cornerstone, but the relationship now encompasses a much broader spectrum – trade, investment, infrastructure development, and even military cooperation.
Saudi Arabia’s booming trade with China is led by crude oil exports, which stood at a staggering $56.1 billion in 2022. This trade isn’t new, but it has grown steadily for over two decades. Total Saudi exports to China have soared from a mere $396 million in 1995 to a $68 billion in 2022.
China’s growing military role is another key development. In recent years, China has become a major arms supplier to Saudi Arabia, with transfers skyrocketing by nearly 400% between 2016 and 2020 compared to the previous five-year period. This deepening military cooperation is further evidenced by Saudi Arabia’s purchase of Chinese drones in 2017 and a joint venture to manufacture them domestically.
The UAE has also deepened its ties with China through substantial investments, amounting to US$11.4 billion between 2003 and 2022. These investments span key sectors like real estate, financial services, green energy, and transportation. The growing partnership culminated in their first-ever joint air force drills last August, further solidified by a recent deal for the UAE to import attack planes from China in 2023.
By analysing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate’s strategic behaviour towards China across security/military, political, and economic sectors, we can reveal the intensity and depth of their partnerships in each area, along with the timeframe over which these strategies have been employed. This multifaceted exploration can provide a clearer picture of these evolving partnerships and their significance in the broader geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, these connections serve to solidify Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s positions as regional hubs with outsized influence, and to exert greater influence on the changing world order.
*Hala Abi Saleh is a PhD candidate at the Catholic University of Louvain (Université Catholique de Louvain). Her work analyses the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through the lens of middle power theory. This blog was developed through discussions at the Mapping Connections Institute, held in Beirut between 27th – 30th May 2024 as part of the ‘Inter-Asia Week’ (Inter-Asia Partnership). The views expressed are the personal perspectives of the writer and not attributable to the Mapping Connections partner institutions.